Abstract
The global financial crisis and EMU
European Economic and Monetary Union is heterogeneous economic area, because it includes individual states with different economic and financial structures. According to the fact that it cannot be avoided a heterogeneous impact of the different Member States, all the states are governed by the logic of economic benefits of unification, convinced that the benefits will overcome the problems of monetary integration. However, numerous problems cannot be easily measured, and it is difficult to understand their nature and significance.
During accessing to the EMU the biggest fear for the states and the biggest lack is possibility of asymmetric disturbances. The problem of asymmetric shocks for states which come together was analyzed by Robert Mundell for the first time in his theory of optimal currency area (OCA) (Mundell 1961, pp. 657-665) , well before the establishment of the European Monetary Union. By European monetary integrations, this problem has been reactualized and became an integral part of analysis, often with diametrically opposite results and views. Thus, for instance point of view of the European Commission is that in EMU are not possible asymmetric shocks, because by monetary integration it comes to expanding the scope of trade and correlation of economic activity, while Paul Krugman insists on opposite views. Specifically, according to Krugman, eliminating the barriers of trade, due to joining the EMU by countries, has affects on the location of industry and the effect of regional activity concentration, which has influence to the ability that the shocks get characteristics of individual countries and become asymmetric.
Unlike various positions, whether in the EMU absence or presence asymmetric shocks, most economists agree that the survival of EMU just depends on the possibility of eliminating the crises. It can be concluded that the problems and solutions for asymmetric shocks are embedded into the idea of EMU, while the financial crisis are exceptional circumstances, outside of European asymmetries, and EMU leaders did not design predefined solutions.
The first serious challenge for the EMU was precisely the global financial crisis, which imposed the issue of the possibility to EMU survive. Although started in the U.S. unexpectedly, the crisis spread to the European continent soon, and seriously damaged the EMU. The emergence of the global financial crisis in the U.S. in August 2007, nobody could predict, and definitely no one economist could determine the speed of diffusion of the global financial crisis on the whole world economy. Another important problem related to the global financial crisis is the fact that everybody analyzed the reasons of crisis, no negative effects caused by financial crisis and how to prevent these negative effects, and by that it was rapidly spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Sometimes absurd sentence by Martin Feldstein: There is a possibility that the conflict between member states, or states within and outside the EMU finish by war, became a potential scenario. (Feldstein 1997, pp. 61-62) The growing differences between the member states contributed to the unexpected negative impact of the global financial crisis. The gap between developed and lower developed countries of EMU, escalated ahead of the global financial crisis, multiplying the 
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differences in borrowing capacity. For example, the interest rate on the long-term government securities in Greece was five times higher than the interest rates on the German government securities. Borrowing costs increased in countries outside the EMU, as well, but that countries had monetary sovereignty and operational capacity of national monetary policy, which could, ultimately to print national money and eliminate differences.
Contrary to the Maastricht Treaty, which did not provide a socialization of loses, it is temporarily resolved the crisis in Greece, and then in Ireland, Spain and Portugal, thanks to donations from member states. But after the Greek problems it imposes a several key issues:
• If Greece almost every year of membership in EMU was beyond the limit of the budget deficit and public debt, solution for the current crisis can nullify negative effects of the deficit, but not the problem of the public debt. The negative effects of the public debt need to be effected in the years to come.
• Second controversy is the question of aid to Greece, namely, whether Greece, Ireland and Portugal received necessary assistance and that several countries were in the same situation.
• The third controversy is the question of a crisis in a countries with dominant share of the GDP, how would be solved the situation of budget deficit and debt in Germany, Italy, France and Spain, because their contribution in total GDP of the EMU is about 75%. Fourth controversy is whether Greece, Ireland, Portugal can cause a domino effect in the EMU.
Generally, observing on the impact of the on the EMU, it can be identified two key problems, which hinder effective response to crisis such as:
• Lack of coordination between macroeconomic policies (as a result of heterogeneous fiscal policies with a vaguely defined focus on the EMU) and • EMU covers only the part of the EU territory (European Central Bank operates only on the part of territory, and the EU institutions operate on EMU states and other EU states outside of EMU). The other drawback is particularly evident during the crisis when it is necessary ordinate action of all economic policies and its main instruments fiscal and monetary policy, which is not feasible in the EMU.
It can be pointed out, despite numerous studies and analysis of asymmetric shocks in the EMU, which were characterized as a dominant factors destabilizing monetary integration, few of them have been devoted analyzing the crisis, especially on a global level, and their potential resolution. That attitude of researchers is likely determined by absence of major financial crisis in recent years, because the Great Depression from the thirties of the last century, by the most economists described as a long time ago. However, it can be safely interpreted Milton Friedman point of view, as an economist that has marked 20 th century and signaled that the EMU, which is designed on the start of the new millennium, its survival and further functioning confirm just in crisis situations, which cannot be predicted and designed their destructive power.
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EMU effects on the member states before and after the global financial crisis
The global financial crisis has only highlighted the problem that has existed since the foundation of the EMU. Single monetary policy cannot have unique effect during the crisis, if there is no single economic policy in the EMU. Because the EMU is created without political integration, economic policy are under the jurisdiction of the national government, and monetary policy as an instrument of economic policy is limited by the lack of harmonization of fiscal policies in the EMU.
The absence of political integration is only one of many shortcomings of the EMU, where mistakes were made since its inception. Although by Maastricht Treaty, which created the EMU, it was defined that movement to the monetary union, beside principle of convergence need to be based on principle of gradualism, EMU leaders have significantly accelerated the start of the third stage, namely, start functioning EMU and some countries gave a lot of concessions and exemptions. States had the biggest problem with the fiscal convergence criteria, which is related with budget deficit and public debt. Gradualism which is required, replaced by urgency and the mistakes that made threatened to jeopardize whole EMU project. In December 1997, only Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal have fully met the convergence criteria, and, in 1999, it was decided that all EU member states become a part of the EMU.
Accelerated creation of the EMU, with a lot of concessions and under-defined rules, it cannot be rationally explained, but it can be assumed that it is result of the effort to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe, as a counterpart to the U.S. dollar, and to offset the effects of turbulence on the dollar in European economy. In fact, some European countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, etc.) feared that a devaluation of the dollar affect to the exchange the dollar with their currencies, which will lead to the appreciation of their currencies and make difficult their export.
Accelerated creation of the EMU had another opposite effect. It is not performed costbenefit analysis in the long-run. In the all theoretical analysis it is not included impact of the global financial crisis. Therefore, in order to determine the final effects of monetary integration it is necessary to analyze the basic economic parameters in the EMU founding states, including the states in regime of exemptions, in the period before and after the global financial crisis. Review of basic economic parameters before the global financial crisis is given in Table 1 . If we consider all the factors for the separate countries summarized in the table above, it can be concluded that the EMU winners are Finland, Ireland, Spain and Italy. Finland is the only state that fully achieved positive results in all criteria considered while all other countries can be considered losers. The biggest losers were France and Germany, considered to be the backbone of the EMU. These results are in accordance with the widespread belief that the monetary union provides more benefits to smaller states. Also, it can be concluded, that Great Britain and Sweden, which did not agree to become part of the EMU, definitely Definitely, a fact that should concern the leaders of EMU is the worst position of Germany. Germany can be described as the biggest loser in the EMU. As a country with the average savings per capita of 60 000 euro per year, whose GDP 1 represents a quarter of total GDP in the EMU, and whose Central bank and currency had a dominant influence on the ECB creation, Germany is considered to be the EMU backbone. Numerous concessions were made for Germany to join the EMU, and despite some skepticism, nobody in Germany could imagine such developments. In the last decade, Germany realized GDP growth by only 18%, increase of inflation by 30% and the unemployment rate by 17%. The alarming data is that the about 50% of the Germans want to leave EMU, and if we add the pronouncement of Germans officials, who pointed out that there was the possibility to return to the Deutsche mark, the situation becomes even more complex. Table 1 give us distorted picture which countries won and which ones lost by joining the EMU, because the basic economic parameters significantly disturbed in some countries after 2008, after the impact of the global financial crisis. Which can be seen in table 2. 
Conclusion
A huge problem in the EMU is the lack of crisis management, or adequate response to the financial crisis. In the case of Ireland, it may be noted that in the period before global financial crisis in 2008, Ireland had a budget surplus and public debt which is twice smaller than required by the Pact of stability and growth. After the crisis, bank debts and huge budget deficit threatened to endanger, not only Ireland, but also the euro zone. EU finance ministers, contrary to the Maastricht Treaty, brought package of support in the form of loans to Ireland (85 billion euro).
Countries with big current account deficit in the EMU have three alternatives:
• Adaptation on the national level (includes the necessary structural reforms, which country have to do in order to increase competiveness of domestic enterprises, increase productivity, increase the flexibility of wages and labor force), • By special regulations should be make impact to during the crisis in the EMU countries with consistently higher export, to increase intra trade and import from countries with deficit (according to some analyzes there are consideration that this measure in the EMU would not have expected effects, because Germany import increase by 10% from deficit countries, it would have impact to increase import from Greece, Portugal and Spain for only 0.25%, and Ireland by 1%, etc).
2
• Finally, as a dominant potential solution for balance of payment deficit, budget and public debt it is obtruded change and consolidation fiscal policy in the EMU. Since Keynes, who pointed out during the first and the biggest crisis in the world, 1929-1933, importance of fiscal policy, fiscal policy is usually given prime importance in the elimination of financial crisis. In the EMU in relatively short-term, fiscal problems of Greece and some Member States have threatened to undermine stability of the financial system in the EMU, so EMU and EU, in May 2010, decided to implement far-reaching measures and help countries in the trouble. The aim of these measures
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The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on the EMU States was fiscal consolidation and harmonization of fiscal policies in the EMU. Fiscal consolidation involves fiscal tightening and radically reducing in the spending and increasing of budget revenues, and by fiscal discipline and harmonize rules expect harmonized effect of public finances. However, to fully achieve these goals it is necessary to be revised basic principles of the Pact of stability and growth. Pact of stability and growth involves political decision about sanctioning individual countries, so it is necessary incorporate system of automatic sanctions. Also, it would be left the emphasis on eliminating the budget deficit and put the emphasis on the regulation of the level of national debt. Additionally, it is necessary to make monitoring of macroeconomic events and effective crisis management.
However, despite these disparities, and the lack of adequate crisis management, it can be assumed how much more difficult would be task of managing crisis situations without existing the EMU, namely with 16 different national currencies and one dominant Deutsche mark. The appreciation of the Deutsche mark forced other nations to raise interest rates, which would further deepen the recessionary trends, depression and reduced demand, production and employment.
It cannot be concluded that EMU fixed the problem of the global financial crisis. Will be crisis situations successfully solved and resisted in the future by EMU, it cannot be fully determined. The crisis has not been completed yet, and the problem has been solved. There is a problem of non harmonized fiscal policy with single monetary policy from the beginning of the functioning EMU, and it escalated and came to the fore during the global turmoil and crisis. Metaphorically, the hole in the aquarium if it sticks with tape, does not guarantee a bright future for fish in aquarium.
